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An Empirical Analysis of the
Medical Informed Consent Doctorine:
Search for a "Standard" of Disclosure*
Jon F. Merz**
Introduction
Informed consent is the legal embodiment of the concept that each
individual has the right to make decisions affecting his or her well-
being. It is generally accepted that individuals should consider - that
is, trade-off - the risks and potential benefits flowing from their
decisions. To do so, decision-makers must have knowledge of those
risks and potential benefits. The law protects the individual's right to
give informed consent by requiring the disclosure of information by the
party to whom consent is given. The right to information arises in three
substantive areas: products liability - failure to warn, worker and
community right-to-know, and medical informed consent. In each case,
issues regarding the disclosure of risks are similar.
Risk may be defined as "exposure to a chance of an injury or
loss." I It embodies two distinct factors: (1) chance relates to
* Support for this research was provided by the National Science Foundation,
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uncertain events - those that are not predictable in any single case, but
for which a probability that an event will occur in any one case may be
estimated; and (2) injury or loss includes any consequence for which
the decision-maker has disutility. In each of the three areas identified
above, the law places on one party a positive obligation to disclose
information regarding risks to the party or parties who are "at risk," that
is, those who will suffer injury if a chance event arises. The antecedent
basis of these laws is the same, but their implementation has diverged.
In each case, what it means to be informed and how consent is given
varies.
Products liability law holds manufacturers and sellers of goods
liable for damages resulting from the intended or foreseeable use of
"unreasonably dangerous" - and therefore defective - products that
they put into the stream of commerce. An "unreasonably dangerous"
product is one for which the benefits are outweighed by the risks, or
one which does not meet reasonable consumer expectations of
safety. 2 As a means of safety regulation, this law tries to give
manufacturers financial incentive to make their products "safe" or
remove them from the marketplace. 3 On the borderline between strict
liability for the marketing of a defective product and manufacturer
negligence in creating or failing to discover a manufacturing flaw in a
product is the failure to give adequate warning of risks inherent in the
use of an otherwise useful product.4 Generally, manufacturers and
resellers have a duty to warn of risks known to them, or risks they
58, 59 (Nov. 1981).
2 See generally PROSSEP AND KEETONONTORTS (5th Ed. 1984).
3 See G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: LEGAL & ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970); Keeton, Products Liability - Some Observations About Allocations of
Risks, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1329 (1966); Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J.
LE AL STUD. 205 (1973).
4 Comment, Foreseeability in Product Design and Duty to Warn Cases -
Distinctions and Misconceptions, 1968 Wis. L. tlv. 228, 234 (1968).
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should have been aware of through the exercise of reasonable care, at
the time the product left their control.5
In failure to warn cases, juries are empowered to determine whether
a risk that transpired in that case was known and whether the warning,
if any, was adequate to enable the reasonable consumer to avoid the risk
either by not using the product or by taking appropriate precautions.6
The scope of the disclosure obligation is uncertain, and, as two
preeminent commentators noted:7
This ground of negligence is probably the most difficult
one for the manufacturer to manage on a satisfactory basis.
Those who argue for warning as the judicial solution to
latent design defects labor under a naive belief that one can
warn against all significant risks. Too much detail can be
counterproductive. A warning to be effective must be read
and understood.
As in all other substantive areas of tort law, there must be a causal
link between the defendant's failure to disclose the risk and the injury
suffered by a plaintiff. In products cases, the law creates a rebuttable
presumption that, had the warning been adequate, the plaintiff would
have taken precautionary measures to avoid the risk - that is, it is
presumed that the plaintiff would not have consented to the use of the
product in the manner which gave rise to the transpired risk.8
Wolker and community right-to-know laws are statutory
5 See generally Keeton, Products Liability - Inadequacy of Information, 48
T1. L. REv. 398 (1970); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and
Abuse of Warnings in Product Liability -Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age,
61 CORNFLL L. REV. 495 (1976).
6 See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973).
7 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, at 686.
8 . Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428 (8th Cir. 1984) (affirming the district
court's application of a rebuttable presumption of causation for inadequate disclosure
in the mass immunization context, based on public policy grounds favoring
compensation of those injured and on the basis of the hard-sell public relations
campaign pursued by the government in the Swine Flu immunization program).
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requirements to inform particular groups of the risks to which members
of the group are, or may be, exposed. Employers are required to assess
chemicals used in the workplace and to make information regarding
physical exposures and any associated risks of those agents to their
employees. 9 Similarly, under various state laws and federal law,
manufacturers are required to publish information regarding various
chemicals used in and released from their plants. 10 In each situation, it
is expected that the group has the means to determine its members'
exposures and any associated health risks, and that group members
individually as well as collectively will take action to reduce their risks
to acceptable levels. 11 If the individual worker does not quit and find a
new job, or homeowners do not move away, or the union or community
groups do not pressure management to lower exposures or emission
levels, then consent may be implied by individual or group inaction.
As discussed more fully in the following section, medical informed
consent law requires the disclosure of the risks of and alternatives to
suggested medical procedures to enable patients to make knowledgeable
decisions about the course of their medical care. 12 As under the failure
9 See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1990); Sussman, An Overview of the
OSHA Hazard Communication Standard and Key Issues of Interpretation, 42 FOOD
DRUG COsM. L. J. 307 (1987); Edwards, Worker Right-to-Know Laws:
Ineffectiveness of Current Policy-Making and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 15
B. C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 1 (1987); Comment, The Extent of OSHA Preemption
of State Hazard Reporting Requirements, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 630 (1988).
10 See generally Haag, Proposition 65's Right-To-Know Provision: Can It Keep
Its Promise to California Voters? 14 ECOLOGY L. Q. 685 (1987); Comment, Will
SARA Smile on Citizen Groups? 6 TEMPLE ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 97 (1987). These
laws also serve to inform emergency personnel such as firefighters of plant
inventories to allow planning for any special conditions that might exist.
11 Haag, supra note 10, at 688.
12 See generally, Merz & Fischhoff, Informed Consent does not Mean Rational
Consent: Cognitive Limitations on Decision-Making, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 321
(1990) (providing an overview of the law as it has developed in all of the states and a
critique thereof based on the cognitive and intellectual decision-making limitations of
patients and physicians).
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to warn laws, the obligation to inform placed upon physicians is
unclear. Unlike the foregoing laws, however, the consent issue is
resolved by looking to what the decision of the reasonable patient at the
time of treatment would have been.
Each of these laws attempts to regulate the disclosure of risk
information by one party to another. Risks are, however, highly
subjective quantities. Research of how people perceive risks and make
decisions in the face of uncertainty has shown that individuals exhibit
biases in their perceptions. 13 Their decisions are often not the products
of rigorous analysis but, rather, the result of simplified rules of thumb.
These limitations militate against consistency and predictability in
choices involving uncertainty. In the substantive areas of the law
identified above, the courts are faced with cases involving issues of risk
and decision-making. How consistently and predictably the courts
resolve these issues will help measure the ability of the courts to regulate
behavior.
While the perception of risk is subjective, there are fairly objective
quantitative measures which may be used for risk and decision analysis
purposes. To study how consistent and predictable the courts are when
dealing with risk issues, this analysis of medical informed consent cases
was undertaken. The analysis methodology and results presented below
are very specific to the substantive and evidentiary law applicable to
informed consent, and generalization to other substantive areas of the
law should be made with caution.
Medical Informed Consent
Informed consent law developed from the intentional tort of battery,
which protects the individual from an unwanted physical touching of the
13 For an introduction to this substantive literature, see JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEuRIsncs AND BIAsEs (D. Kahnenan, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds.
1982).
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body by one having neither express nor implied consent of the person
touched nor a privilege to do so. Battery occurs in the medical setting
when the physician performs a treatment without the consent of the
patient, 14 performs a substantially different procedure than the one for
which consent was given, 15 exceeds the scope of the consent,16 or a
different physician than the one to whom consent was given carries out
the procedure. 17 As informed consent became a recognized basis for
physician liability, the courts reasoned that any consent based on
inadequate information was vitiated by the failure of the physician to
disclose, and therefore that an unconsented touching occurred: to wit, a
battery.
It did not take long for the courts to realize, however, that
characterizing the tort in battery placed too great a burden on the medical
14 See, e.g., Lanford v. York, 457 S.W.2d 525 (Tenn. 1970) (unauthorized
biopsy); Beck v. Lovell, 361 So.2d 245 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (unauthorized tubal
ligation); Meretsky v. Ellenby, 370 So.2d 1222 (Fla. Ct. App. 1979) (physician
operated on tip of nose against expressed wish of patient).
15 See, e.g., Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954) (consent
to circumcision, not vasectomy); Lane v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 850 (E.D. Va.
1964) (surgery on wrong knee); Bobrick v. Bravstein, 116 A.D.2d 682, 497
N.Y.S.2d 749 (1986) (plaintiff expected knee surgery, not abdominal surgery); Arena
v. Gingrich, 305 Or. 1, 748 P.2d 547 (1988) (physician explained two methods to
repair hiatal hernia, employed third method).
16 See, e.g., Campbell v. Oliva, 424 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1970) (consent to repair
one condyle, not both); Jackson v. Julian, 694 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)
(consent to remove one ovary, both were removed).
17 Johnson v. McMurray, 461 So.2d 775 (Ala. 1984); Martin v. Southern Baptist
Hosp., 444 So.2d 1309 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (barred by statute of limitations); Perna
v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 457 A.2d 431 (1983); but see, Forlano v. Hughes, 393
Mass. 502, 471 N.E.2d 1315 (1984) (plaintiff consented to one physician and made
no objection before or during performance by different physician); Walstad v.
University of Minnesota Hosp., 442 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1971) (same). The claim
properly sounds in battery and not informed consent. Buie v. Reynolds, 571 P.2d
1230 (Okl. Ct. App. 1977) (plaintiff failed to state a battery count where surgeon
permitted a resident to perform substantial portion of surgery); Guebard v. Jabaay,
117 II.App.3d 1, 72 111. Dec. 498,452 N.E.2d 751(1983) (plaintiff withdrew battery
count, could not recover under informed consent theory).
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profession and, perhaps, did not emphasize enough the regulatory
aspect of the law. 18 Currently, the courts nearly unanimously treat lack
of informed consent as a matter of negligence of the physician to
disclose necessary information to patients. 19 Negligence requires that
four elements be established for liability of the defendant: (1) a duty of
defendant to meet a particular standard of care; (2) failure to perform that
duty; (3) a causal connection between defendant's failure and plaintiff's
injury; and (4) an injury in fact, that is, one for which monetary
compensation is adequate relief.
The prototypical informed consent case arises when a patient suffers
an injurious, nonnegligently-caused outcome of a diagnostic or
therapeutic medical procedure.2 0 An outcome that is nonnegligently
18 The seminal case is Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960),
modified, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1961). See also Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58
Wis.2d 596, 207 N.W.2d 297, 312-13 (1973) (listing 5 reasons why assault and
battery are inadequate in the informed consent setting).
19 The exceptions are Pennsylvania and Tennessee. See generally Plant, An
Analysis of "Informed Consent", 36 FORDHAM L. RPv. 639 (1968) (distinguishing
the causes of action). Cf. Katz, Informed Consent - A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision,
39 U. Prr. L. REV. 137, 139 (1977); Gallub, Assessing Culpability in the Law of
Torts: A Call for Judicial Scrutiny in Comparing "Culpable Conduct" under New
York's CPLR 1411, 37 SYRAcUSE L. REv. 1079, 1121-27 (1987).
20 Several cases have applied the doctrine to the situation where the plaintiff had
refused a recommended test or treatment, ostensibly without being warned of the
possible consequences of that refusal. Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal.3d 285, 611 P.2d
902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980) (patient refused pap smears over a long time period
and subsequently died from cervical cancer).
A similar situation arose in Crisher v. Spak, 122 N.Y.Misc.2d 355, 471
N.Y.S.2d 741 (1983), where plaintiff refused surgical treatment of a pinched nerve in
her leg, which turned out to be caused by a malignant tumor, necessitating
subsequent amputation. The court avoided the statutorily mandated professional
standard, opining, "[P]laintiff's claim here is not based on surgery without informed
consent but, rather, on the negligent failure of the doctor to provide to his patient the
information necessary to make an appropriate decision." 122 N.Y.Misc.2d, at 359.
The opinion is specious and highly dependent upon perfect hindsight. The court
found that "all Dr. Spak need have told his patient was: 'Mrs. Crisher we do not
know what is wrong with your foot. It may be many things, including a tumor. It is
important to your health that we find out. The only way to do that is to operate."'
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caused is one which arises in a certain percentage of cases regardless of
the care of the physician, due to physiological differences from the norm
or particular susceptibilities of a patient, or one that arises from an act or
failure to act of the physician but such act or failure to act is within the
standard of care.2 1 In order to recover damages for that outcome, the
122 N.Y.Misc.2d, at 358. This, even though the defendant "testified that... he did
not even consider the possibility of a tumor." 122 N.Y.Misc.2d, at 356. If the failure
to anticipate or diagnose a tumor as the cause of the pinched nerve does not rise to
the level of negligence, then there is no duty to foresee that possibility, and only
through hindsight can the court's proposed warning take place. If, however, the base
rate (i.e., the rate in the population of patients presenting with the same symptoms)
of tumor as a cause of a pinched nerve is high enough that the reasonable physician
should have known of that possibility, then the cause of action sounds properly in
negligence for failure to diagnose, not informed consent.
The court's emasculation of the informed consent law of New York is also in
error, inasmuch as the action clearly sounds in informed consent. As the Federal
Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit said: "The philosophy behind such theory of
informed consent is that the patient has the right and responsibility to determine
whether he wants to risk the suggested corrective surgery. If the patient's decision is
to be a knowing and intelligent one, he must understand in addition to the risks of
the suggested surgery, the possible results of the failure to chance it. A complete
understanding of the consequences of foregoing the operation would seem necessarily
to include a consideration of the alternative treatment for the patient's disease or
condition." Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940, 944 (3d Cir. 1970). Cf. Scalere v.
Stenson, 211 Cal. App.3d 1446, 1453, 260 Cal. Rpfr. 152, 156 (1989) (recognizing
that the appropriate action sounds in ordinary medical negligence for failure to
diagnose).
21 Meisel, The Expansion of Liability For Medical Accidents: From Negligence to
Strict Liability By Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REv. 51, 52-3 (1977).
Because plaintiffs run the risk of failing to establish by expert testimony that their
injuries were the result of their physician's negligence in diagnosing or carrying out a
procedure, the informed consent claim has become a gratuitous appendage in
malpractice litigation. Disclosure does not prevent frivolous claims, perhaps
justifying more liberal use of sanctions. In Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 521 So.2d
534 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (en banc), writ denied, 522 So.2d 571, afftd, 531 So.2d
450 (La. 1988), plaintiff sued after suffering leg numbness and loss of bladder control
following a lumbar laminectomy, and testified "that she knew death, paralysis and
loss of other bodily functions can result from surgery." 521 So.2d at 452; and in
Vanlperen v. VanBramer, 392 N.W.2d 480 (Iowa 1986), the jury found that
disclosure occurred, and, on appeal, the plaintiff conceded that the possibility of
hearing loss inherent in antibiotic use had been discussed with her. See also,
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plaintiff must establish the elements of negligence, that: (1) the
physician had a duty to disclose particular information to the patient; (2)
disclosure did not occur; (3) (a) but for the nondisclosure, the tendered
procedure would have been refused, and (b) that the tendered procedure
was the cause in fact of plaintiff's injury; and (4) the plaintiff suffered a
compensable injury.22
There are two dominant approaches to defining the standard of
disclosure of information by which the physician's duty to their patients
is measured. 23 A slim majority of states follow the "professional
Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963) (parents of boy who died
during cardiac catheterization both testified that they knew there was a risk).
22 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, at 189-93.
23 For a recent review of the development of the law and the standards of disclosure
throughout the United States, see Merz & Fischhoff, supra note 12. There are a
small number of alternative standards, dictated by statute, that bring the disclosure
duty outside of either standard discussed here. For example, Louisiana's statute
requires the disclosure of known risks of death; brain damage; quadriplegia;
paraplegia; the loss of or loss of function of bodily organ or limb; and disfiguring
scars. 40 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.40 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989). Consent
forms that recite that these risks are associated with the procedure have been upheld
by the courts as satisfying the statutory requirement. See, e.g., Hondroulis, 521
So.2d 534; Hutton v. Craighead, 530 So.2d 101 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Jones v. Levy,
520 So.2d 457 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Leonhard v. New Orleans East Orthopedic
Clinic, 485 So.2d 1008 (La. Ct. App. 1986), writ denied, 489 So.2d 919 (La.
1986); and Madere v. Ochsner Foundation Hospital, 505 So.2d 146 (La. CL App.
1987). If the consent form doesn't meet the statutory requirement, the materiality
standard applies. LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So.2d 1039 (La. 1983), concurring op.,
437 So.2d 869 (La. 1983).
An interesting comparison is with the informed consent law of Iowa, the
standard of which reads nearly verbatim with the Louisiana statute. IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 147.137(1) (West Supp. 1988). The Iowa courts have read the statute as a
codification of the materiality approach. Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center,
408 N.W.2d 355, 361 (1987). See also Georgia Medical Consent Law, GA. CODE
ANN. § 31-9-1 (1985).
In Oregon, physicians must disclose only in general terms the nature of the
procedure and that there may be alternatives and risks. The physician must then ask
the patient if a more thorough explanation is desired, and if so, all material risks and
viable alternatives are to be disclosed. OREGON REV. STAT. ANN. § 677.097(2)
(1989).
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standard," requiring a physician to disclose information that other
physicians possessed of the same skills and practicing in the same or a
similar community would disclose in the same situation.24 A large
minority of courts apply the "materiality" or "prudent patient" approach,
allowing the jury to decide whether risk or other information would
have been considered significant by the reasonable patient in making a
decision, therefore requiring disclosure. 25
The courts recognize situations where a physician's nondisclosure
will be excused. 2 6 Briefly, if a patient is incompetent to make a
In addition, the courts in several states apply both standards, as dictated by
statute, Nelson v. Patrick, 326 S.E.2d 45 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985), or because the issue
has not been finally decided in that forum, Martin v. Stratton, 515 P.2d 1366 (Okla.
1973); Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1976); Lemke v. United States,
557 F. Supp. 1205 (D.N.D. 1983). Several courts have adopted the materiality
approach as placing an. extra disclosure obligation upon the physician, i.e., the
physician must disclose that information other physicians would disclose under the
same circumstances, and in addition must disclose information that would be material
to the decision of the reasonable patient. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972); Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684 (Minn. 1977),
modified, 295 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1980). A few courts apply the materiality
approach but allow that evidence of a professional standard of disclosure might be
"relevant and material" to the withholding of information. Klink v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 26 Wash.App. 951, 614 P.2d 701 (1980); Wasem v. Laskowski, 274 N.W.2d
219 (N.D. 1979). Lastly, some courts exclude evidence of a professional standard as
irrelevant to the issue of materiality. Creasey v. Hogan, 48 Or.App. 683, 617 P.2d
1377 (1980); Rogers v. Lu, 335 Pa. Super. 595, 485 A.2d 54 (1984). This latter
approach could cut both ways - a jury could find a risk to be immaterial despite a
physician practice of disclosure in the community.
24 The most influential decision rejecting the professional standard questioned
whether a custom for disclosure in the medical profession truly exists. Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783-84 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See infra note 82.
25 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787. At least one court construed the determination of
materiality to be a subjective one, i.e., whether the plaintiff would have considered
the information important in making the decision, Cowman v. Hornaday, 329
N.W.2d 422, 427 (Iowa 1983); Vanperen, 392 N.W.2d 480, but the issue has been
settled in Iowa on an objective finding, Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d 355.
26 See Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a
Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decision Making, 1979 WIS. L.
REV. 413, 487 (1979).
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reasoned decision, then disclosure to the patient may not be required.27
Under the therapeutic privilege, the physician may withhold
information if disclosure would be upsetting or otherwise would
interfere with treatment or adversely affect the condition or recovery of
the patient.28 Finally, the emergency exception applies in situations
where attempting to secure consent could detrimentally delay proper
treatment.2 9 More generally, physicians need not disclose risks of
which the patient is already aware or risks which are commonly
known.3 0
The causation element establishes the link between the physician's
nondisclosure and plaintiff's injury upon which liability is predicated.
In informed consent (as well as in products failure to warn), the element
27 See, e.g., Banks v. Wittenberg, 82 Mich. 274, 266 N.W.2d 788 (1978);
Grannum v. Berard, 70 Wash.2d 304,422 P.2d 812 (1967).
28 Cases where the privilege was an issue include Ball v. Mallinkrodt Chemical
Works, 53 Tenn.App. 218, 381 S.W.2d 563, 568 (1964); Roberts v. Wood, 206
F.Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962); Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Haw. 188, 473 P.2d 116
(1970); Carmen v. Dippold, 63 Ill.App.3d 419, 20 IM. Dec. 297, 379 N.E.2d 1365,
1370 (1978); Pardy v. United States, 783 F.2d 710, 712 (7th Cir. 1986). In North
Carolina, exercise of the privilege may no longer be sufficient to obviate the duty to
disclose all "material" information. Nelson, 326 S.E.2d at 52. See also Carnerie,
Crisis and Informed Consent: Analysis of a Law-Medicine Malocclusion, 12 AM. J.
L. & MED. 55 (1986).
29 See Dunham, 423 F.2d 940; Stafford v. Louisiana State University, 448 So.2d
852 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
30 But see Kissinger v. Lofgren, 836 F.2d 678 (lst Cir. 1988) (affirming a jury
verdict for plaintiff, where plaintiff suffered painful damage to his left infraorbital
nerve from surgical removal of a sinus tumor, even though plaintiff had been warned
by two different physicians that the tricky or delicate part of the operation was
avoiding damage to the infraorbital nerve, and plaintiff even sought out defendant to
perform the procedure because of defendant's greater experience with the procedure);
Kinikin v. Heupel, 305 N.W.2d 589, 595 (Minn. 1981) (affirming a verdict for
plaintiff, where plaintiff suffered from post surgical skin necrosis, defendant argued
unsuccessfully that plaintiff knew about this risk since she had experienced necrosis
during her many abdominal operations by defendant); Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d
558, 561 note 13 (D.C. App. 1982) (affirming a verdict for plaintiff, where plaintiff
suffered an infection after receiving a cortisone injection to relieve her arthritis).
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has two parts, which are often imprecisely and confusingly combined
into a single causation question by trial and reviewing courts. First,
plaintiff must establish what may be termed "decisional causation," that
is, but for the nondisclosure by defendant, the procedure from which
the injury arose would not have been accepted. In most jurisdictions,
this issue is based on an objective finding that the reasonable person in
the patient's position would have refused the tendered treatment had the
information been disclosed.3 1 A small minority have adopted a
subjective approach, that is, that the patient would have forgone
treatment if informed. 32 Pennsylvania alone has done away with the
causation element, based on the continued characterization of the tort in
battery.3 3 The second "causation" element involved is the "physical
31 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790-91.
32 Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972); Cunningham v.
Yankton Clinic, P.A., 262 N.W.2d 508 (S.D. 1978); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d
554 (Okla. 1979); McPherson v. Ellis, 305 N.C. 266, 287 S.E.2d 892 (1982). The
subjective approach has been generally rejected because the courts are wary of the
plaintiff's hindsight-biased testimony on this point. The hindsight problem is
exacerbated by the patient's propter hoc optimism: "[Olptimism is greatest for
hazards with which subjects have little personal experience, [and] for hazards rated
low in probability ... ." Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, 246
ScIENcE 1232, 1232 (1989). For example, in Contreras v. St. Luke's Hosp., 78
Cal.App.3d 919, 923, 144 Cal. Rptr. 647, 650 (1978), plaintiff was nonsuited where
the defendant had told him: "In one out of a hundred operations, infection was one of
the complications." to which plaintiff had replied: "Doctor, you say it's one out of a
hundred. Then I'm not going to be the one."
33 Sagala v. Tavares, 367 Pa. Super. 573, 533 A.2d 165 (1987), allocatur denied,
518 Pa. 626, 541 A.2d 1138 (1988); Jozsa v. Hottenstein, 364 Pa. Super. 469, 528
A.2d 606 (1987), allocatur denied, 518 Pa. 619, 541 A.2d 746 (1988); Gouse v.
Cassel, 385 Pa. Super. 521, 561 A.2d 797 (1989); allocatur granted, 569 A.2d 1367
524 Pa. 608 (1989). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which has not heard an
informed consent case'in 24 years, will have to address several issues arising from
this approach. For example, can patients recover nominal damages for the technical
battery even if no injury occurs? Are punitive damages available? Neither of these
attributes of battery can be said to reflect desirable policy towards the medical
profession. Nonetheless, resolution of these issues against plaintiffs would be
inconsistent with general battery theory. If the courts are willing to recognize
exceptions from normal battery law for nominal and punitive damages in the
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causation" issue common in all negligence actions. The plaintiff must
establish that the injury suffered was the result of the medical procedure
tendered - that the risk which transpired was one known by the
medical community to be associated with the procedure and that it arose
in the instant case from the performance of that procedure. 3 4
Throughout this article, "causation" shall refer to "decisional causation"
introduced here.
informed consent technical battery case, they would undermine the justification for
doing away with the causation requirement. It would be inconsistent to assert that the
informed consent technical battery is a battery and therefore causation need not be
shown, while disallowing recovery of nominal and punitive damages on the basis
that informed consent is only a technical battery. Further, it must be questioned how
a defendant can be held liable for damages that he or she did not cause, within the due
process constraints of the 5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. "Mhe
framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument as a rule for the government
of courts, as well as of the legislature." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Brand) 49,
71 (1808). Finally, as argued more fully elsewhere, asking a jury to assess the
"materiality" of a risk without consideration of the medical decision to be made with
that information may produce a biased answer. Merz, Musings on Materiality: A
Decision-Theoretic Critique of the "Prudent Patient" Disclosure Standard for
Informed Consent, (forthcoming) (discussing the limitations of the formulation of
the "materiality" issue from a decision-making point of view, and further developing
the concept of decisional causation introduced here).
34 Because there cannot be a requirement to disclose risks which are not known to
the medical community, this element places a limitation on the disclosure duty. See
Cornfeldt, 295 N.W.2d at 640-41 (halothane hepatitis); Gordon v. Neviaser, 478
A.2d 292 (D.C. App. 1984) (shoulder injury worsened after surgery); Hartfiel v.
Owen, 618 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (stroke during chiropractic
adjustment); Marshall v. Clinic for Women, P.A., 490 So.2d 861 (Miss. 1986) (Cu-
7 IUD use preceded ectopic pregnancy and ovarian cysts); Nicholl v. Reagan, 208
N.J. Super. 644, 506 A.2d 805 (1986) (use of wire sutures versus catgut, suture
protruded through skin); Parker v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 335 So.2d 725
(La. Ct. App. 1976) (induced labor and amniotomy followed by postpartum
hemorrhage, uterine atony, emergency hysterectomy); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93
(Utah 1982) (cardiac arrest occurred subsequent to amniocentesis).
A good number of the cases arising from the Swine Flu vaccination program in
the winter of 1976 were decided on this basis. Bean v. United States, 533 F. Supp.
567 (D. Colo. 1980) (foot drop); Freeman v. United States, 704 F.2d 154 (5th Cir.
1983) (adhesive capsulitis); Hasler v. United States, 718 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1983)
(rheumatoid arthritis); Marneef v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(peripheral neuropathy).
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This overview identifies two dominant methods for delimiting the
disclosure obligations of physicians. To summarize, the duty to disclose
attaches - ex post - upon either the jury finding that there existed at
the time of treatment a physician practice of disclosure, or the jury
finding that a bit of information would have been "material" to the
reasonable person in the patient's position at the time of treatment.
Arguably, physicians will seek to disclose the more substantial risks of
which they are aware. If so, then the two disclosure standards may
converge - the lay and the professional views of risks that need to be
disclosed to allow patients to make informed decisions may be the same.
The "materiality" jurisdiction courts have attempted to provide some
guidance to physicians and jurors by indicating that the physician's duty
to disclose risk information increases as the magnitude of the risk
increases. 3 5 Further, some courts and commentators have expressed
the idea that risks having severe consequences, e.g., of death or serious
disability, are material and should be disclosed independent of the
frequency. 36 "Severe risks (e.g., death, paralysis, loss of a sense)
should always be disclosed, even when the probability of occurrence is
almost negligible. Less severe risks which have a high incidence of
occurrence likewise should always be disclosed. Nominal risks with
little likelihood of occurrence need not be disclosed."'37 Not all courts
place emphasis solely on consequences, recognizing that frequency is an
important component of risk.38 Indeed, one commentator interpreted
35 These courts uniformly fail to give explicit guidelines or to identify on what
scale risks are to be measured. See Merz & Fischhoff, supra note 12, at 334.
36 For example, one commentator felt that "[any foreseeable risk is material to the
medical consumer's decision, for it is the consumer, and not the physician, who bears
the physical (and financial) brunt of the risk." Maldonado, Strict Liability and
Informed Consent: "Don't Say I Didn't Tell You So!", 9 AKRON L. REV. 609, 615
(1976).
37 Note, Malpractice: Toward a Viable Disclosure Standard for Informed Consent,
32 OKLA. L. REV. 868, 886-87 (1979).
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the cases as creating a frequency-based standard, finding a one percent
threshold for liability.39
The courts stress that "fulr' disclosure, whatever is encompassed by
that term, is not required. There are several reasons why full disclosure
as a matter of course is unlikely in medical practice. First, the number of
risks possible from even routine procedures is great. For example, in a
footnote, the California Supreme Court recited some of the risks from
having blood drawn: "[T]he risks ... are said to include hematoma,
dermatitis, cellulitis, abscess, osteomyelitis, septicemia, endocarditis,
thrombophlebitis, pulmonary embolism and death, to mention a
few." 40 Similarly, the Louisiana State Medical Society, in an amicus
38 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788; Precourt v. Frederick, 395 Mass. 689, 481
N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (1985). Quantitative estimates of frequency are not always
available, but this may not keep the issue of materiality from the jury. For example,
when not quantifiable, the courts may rely solely on whether the risk was known or
not. Hitchcock v. United States, 665 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1981), affg 479 F. Supp.
65 (D.D.C. 1979) (allowing recovery for a paralytic reaction to preexposure rabies
vaccination). Other courts have expressly allowed the jury to assess their own
frequency of occurrence from testimony provided. In Kissinger, the court found that:
"The jury had evidence from which to find the likelihood of occurrence of the harm.
There was ample evidence that the risk of injury to the nerve was substantial, 'a
known risk,' ... Precourt did not consider... whether the materiality analysis
requires an expert to assess the risk of occurrence in terms of numerical data and we
refuse to adopt such a rule." 836 F.2d at 681. The court continued in its footnote:
"To accept a rule of that nature would be to glorify unduly the epidemiological
statistician's art, and to foreclose meritorious suits in areas where precise statistics
are yet unavailable." Id. One must question the use of the oxymoron "precise
statistics." Statistics only provide a tool for quantitatively understanding uncertainty.
If the uncertainty in the likelihood of a risk cannot be quantified, it may be
questioned, first, whether the risk is one that is known and foreseeable to the medical
community, and second, whether disclosure of a mere possibility of some outcome
without any expression of the likelihood of that outcome transpiring can enable a
person to make a reasonable decision based on the limited information.
39 This interpretation is at best premature. Britain, Product Honesty is the Best
Policy: A Comparison of Doctors' and Manufacturers' Duty to Disclose Drug Risks
and the Importance of Consumer Expectations in Determining Product Defect, 79
Nw. U.L. REv. 342, 386-98 (1984).
40 Cobbs, 8 Cal.3d at 244, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 505, 502 P.2d at 11 (1972).
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brief, identified 156 known risks associated with a laminectomy.4 1
Second, the burden of identifying small consequence and diminishingly
unlikely risks is too great upon the practitioner, and the resulting choice
by the patient would likely be seriously impaired by such a listing.
Indeed, many courts have recognized the bind placed by the law upon
the physician, where the disclosure of too much information so as to
lead the patient to refuse needed treatment could rise to the level of
negligence. 42
Despite the courts' pronunciations that "full" disclosure is not
required, the courts have failed to enunciate clear limits on what must be
disclosed. Given further that the bounds of the disclosure obligation are
to be determined, if at all, on a case-by-case basis, then it takes no great
leap of faith to conclude that no physician can absolutely avoid liability
under the informed consent laws unless he or she discloses every
known risk and alternative to every patient. Indeed, the California
Supreme Court recently noted this uncertainty: "One cannot know with
certainty whether a consent is valid until a lawsuit has been filed and
resolved. ' 43 The present study was motivated to discover whether a
consistent, reduceable standard44 of disclosure is being delimited to
41 Hondroulis, 521 So.2d at 454.
42 No cases have been found that were decided on this issue. See, e.g., Collins v.
Meeker, 198 Kan. 390, 424 P.2d 488 (1967); Miceikis v. Field, 37 Ill.App.3d 763,
768, 347 N.E.2d 320, 324 (1976); and St. Gemme v. Tomlin, 118 Ill.App.3d 766,
74 Ill.Dec. 264, 455 N.E.2d 294, 298 (1983) (defense counsel made this point to the
jury in closing argument). A related issue is the possibility of parental liability for
an "irrational" choice of treatment for a child, and possible professional negligence
for not seeking a court order for the suggested treatment to override the parents'
contrary choice. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal.App.3d 811,
165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980) (in dicta, the court recognized a possible claim for
wrongful birth against parents who made a conscience choice to proceed with
pregnancy with knowledge of the child's likely condition; the legislature responded
by relieving parents of liability).
43 Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal.3d 120, 165,793 P.2d
479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 147, note 41 (1990). See Meisel, supra note 21.
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which physicians may comport their behavior so as to avoid liability
with certitude.45
Analysis Hypothesis
Inasmuch as the risk information provided in these cases is
objective, that is, a given consequence may have a known frequency of
occurrence from a particular medical procedure, then the duty to disclose
a risk, represented by the proxy of a court outcome, may be modeled as
a function of the frequency of an outcome and various conceivable
measures of those consequences. If there is any clear demarcation
between "material" and "immaterial" risks, then the model applied to the
broad collection of informed consent cases may identify what risks need
to be disclosed. Further, inasmuch as the plaintiff must establish
"decisional causation," then it may be hypothesized that a legally-
enforced disclosure duty is greater for "elective" medical procedures
than for life saving procedures - because a nondisclosure is more
44 A standard is "something that is established by authority, custom, or general
consent as a model or example to be followed." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INrE 1TrONAL DICIONARY 2223 (1981). Query whether a "standard" that is to be
determined on a case-by-case basis can ever meet this definition, especially in light of
the fact that a jury's finding in one case will not bar a different jury from the
opposite finding of fact. Indeed, the first jury's decision, if offered as evidence of the
standard of care, would probably be ruled irrelevant and inadmissible, although an
exception to the general rule could be justified to show the reasonableness of the
defendant's behavior in light of trial outcomes. Merz, supra note 33, at 11-13. It is
axiomatic that traditional notions of due process and fundamental fairness require that
the law, whether judicially or legislatively created, give reasonable notice of
prohibited conduct so that the average person may comport his or her behavior so as
to avoid liability. "As a matter of due process under the fifth amendment, reasonable
notice must be given to the public of what conduct must be avoided. Whether in civil
or criminal proceedings, it is unequivocally established that that basic right to notice
applies." A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239
(1925). See also Connolly v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
45 The curmudgeon's response is that nothing in life is certain. Nonetheless, the
rule of law is without doubt undermined when the reasonable person cannot, even by
exercising utmost care and diligence, avoid punishment. Perhaps this view helps
explain physicians' frustrations with informed consent.
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likely to be excused in the latter case.
Figure 1





Figure 1 graphically presents the combined hypothesis - the
probability of a plaintiff verdict should increase with increasing
valuation of the nondisclosed risk and decrease with the degree to which
treatment is medically necessary.
This hypothesis may be viewed as redefining the physician's duty to
disclose risks as a function of both the negligence concept of "duty"
with de facto limitations on that duty arising from the "decisional
causation" element. Justification for this simplification is fourfold: (1)
Court cases provide the primary means of feedback to medical
practitioners of their legal obligations, and verdicts often take the form
of general verdicts, where the jury will find for either party. Even if
there were a method for systematically disseminating this information to
the medical profession,46 general verdicts favoring defendant do not
identify the jury's reasoning for that decision; i.e., whether it is based
46 See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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on the failure of the defendant to meet the appropriate standard of care in
disclosing, or whether the plaintiff failed to establish decisional
causation. It is egregious to place upon individuals a legal duty the limits
of which cannot be ascertained with reasonable effort.
(2) Nondisclosure of a risk in a situation where the reasonable patient
would regardless agree to the tendered procedure "is legally without
consequence."' 47 Inasmuch as negligence law will not sanction
nondisclosures where plaintiff fails to establish either the "duty" or
"decisional causation" element, the distinction between them may be
ignored for no legally enforced obligation is recognized unless both
elements are satisfied. (3) With respect to the "materiality"
determination, deciding whether any particular information is important
to a decision requires assessment of the decision in which the
information is to be used. Bifurcation of the "materiality" and
"decisional causation" issues may confuse the finder of fact and prevent
a complete assessment of these issues. If so, there should be one
combined "materiality" and "causation" question, subsumed in the
broader concept of duty defined here, for resolution by the jury.4 8 (4)
Within the medical profession, good practice may dictate that certain
disclosures take place. While this may give rise to a "duty" and standard
of care within the profession, in the absence of decisional causation, this
duty is not enforced by the law, and the bounds of the legal duty may
thus be interpreted to be narrower than those of the professional duty
For each of the above reasons, this analysis takes the more liberal
view of a legal duty to disclose the risks of and alternatives to treatment.
It is not asserted, however, that this legal duty bounds the physician's
disclosure obligation - the physician must still inform his or her patient
of the nature of the procedure and the expected course of therapy and, of
47 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790 (stated with respect to the necessity for an injury
in fact).
48 This idea is more fully developed in Merz, supra note 33.
2 RISK -Issues in Health & Safety 27 [Winter 1991]
course, must be truthful. Patients still have interests in information that
are adequately protected by battery law - the factual and legal
differences between the two theories of physician liability should be
maintained steadfastly.49
Method
Logistic regression provides a technique whereby a dichotomous
response variable, such as a court outcome (i.e., plaintiff or defense
decision), may be explored for the effects thereon of categorical or
continuous explanatory variables. 50 For the present analysis, over 450
reported decisions have been reviewed. These cases are predominantly
appellate opinions, but include about 10 percent trial court opinions
(verdicts by the court and opinions on motions). In addition, a data set
comprised of summary information about trial court outcomes of
informed consent cases has been acquired. Logistic regression will be
used in this analysis to try to determine if the hypothesis presented
above is supported by the cases.
L Data and Preliminary Analysis
Two sets of data have been collected for this analysis. The first was
developed by the author by reviewing over 450 published informed
consent cases, comprising predominantly appellate decisions. All but
228 of these cases have been excluded from this quantitative analysis.
The second is a set of 187 summaries of trial cases secured from Jury
Verdict Research, Inc. (JVR). Cases not addressing the informed
consent issue, those not presenting enough information for this
49 Plant, supra note 19.
50 The logistic in most general form represents the log odds of the modeled
outcome as a linear function of the independent variables: log (p/l-p) = a + bX, or p
= 1/(1 - e(a + bX)), or the form given as Equation 1. For all X, p lies between zero
and one, and is the estimated probability of the outcome given X. For a good
description of this methodology, see S.E. FEINBERG, THE ANALYSIS OF CROSS-
CLASSIFIED CATEGORICAL DATA (2d ed. 1979).
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analysis, those decided on battery grounds, and those based on
alternative disclosure standards51 have been excluded from this
quantitative analysis. The cases comprising the two data sets are
exclusive.52
A. Reported Cases
The information derived from the case reports includes the complaint
or illness of the patient seeking treatment, the type of treatment
rendered, the consequences that subsequently transpired from that
treatment, and the numerical estimate of the frequency of the transpired
risk, when presented. Categorical factors in the cases that were recorded
for analysis of their impact on court outcomes include: (1) disclosure
standard, either professional or materiality; 53 (2) causation standard,
either objective or subjective; 54 (3) whether the court has characterized
51 See supra note 23.
52 Only two cases appeared in both data sets, and both are included in only the
reported data. Baltzell v. VanBuskirk, 752 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
(affirming a jury verdict for defendant); and Largey v. Rothman, 110 NJ. 204, 540
A.2d 504 (1988) (defendant verdict on remand).
53 Some of the older cases did not clearly enunciate a standard. Some subjectivity in
categorization was thus necessary. If the court deferred to the physician's judgment in
deciding how much to disclose, this was treated as a professional standard case. Salgo
v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Board of Trustees, 154 Cal.App.2d 560, 317 P.2d 170
(1957); Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960), modified, 360 S.W.2d
673 (Mo. 1962); Ball, 381 S.W.2d 563; Watson v. Clutts, 266 N.C. 153, 136
S.E.2d 617 (1964); Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 140 N.W.2d 139 (1966);
Walstad v. University of Minnesota Hosp., 442 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1971); Bennett v.
Graves, 557 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977), Brigham v. Hicks,.44 N.C.App. 116,
260 S.E.2d 435 (1979). Several courts spoke in terms of reasonable disclosures, and
were therefore categorized as materiality cases. Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221,
377 P.2d 520 (1962); DiRosse v. Wein, 24 A.D.2d 510, 261 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1965);
Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663 (1966); Sharpe v. Pugh, 270 N.C.
598, 155 S.E.2d 108 (1967); Koury v. Folio, 272 N.C .386, 158 S.E.2d 548
(1968).
54 A number of courts discussed the element from a subjective viewpoint, and these
cases were coded as applying a subjective standard, although it is doubtful that thejury was charged on subjective causation inasmuch as it is not the proper law in thatjurisdiction. See, e.g., Mallett v. Pirkey, 171 Colo. 271, 466 P.2d 466 (1970);
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treatment as elective; 55 (4) whether the court discussed the availability
Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash.App. 230, 523 P.2d 211 (1974); Hartliel v. Owen, 618
S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Kranda v. Houser-Norborg Medical Corp., 419
N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Doss v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 448 So.2d 813
(La. App.), writ denied, 450 So.2d 359 (La. 1984). Finally, a large number of cases
did not discuss the causation element, usually because the issue was not reached.
There is always the potential problem that the standards enunciated in the
appellate courts are not being implemented in jury charges, and the only way to
verify this for this data set would be to contact the attorneys involved. Inasmuch as
the causation standard does not appear to be an important predictor of outcome, this
task would not be worthwhile. This study therefore assumes astute advocacy in
preparing jury charges, timely objections, and appealing erroneous charges. But see
Slater v. Kehoe, 38 Cal.App.3d 819, 113 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1974) (jury charged to
subjective causation); Tenney v. Bedell, 624 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same).
55 "Elective" means different things to different courts. See, e.g., Riedinger v.
Colburn, 361 F. Supp. 1073, 1075-76 (D. Idaho 1973) (characterizing an anterior
cervical excision treatment for whiplash: "the surgery.., can be termed major
'elective' surgery. It is major in the sense that it is not without the same risks
inherent in any operation involving an attack on body tissues under a general
anesthetic. It is 'elective' in the sense that it is not necessary as a matter of life and
death, but rather is a matter of choice to the patient depending upon his or her desire
to try to eliminate problems of discomfort."); Cowman, 329 N.W.2d 422
(vasectomy for socioeconomic reasons "so optional that it would not qualify even as
'elective surgery' as defined by the Riedinger court." Id. at 424-25, fn. 1).
Similarly, the court in Watkins v. Parpala, 2 Wash.App. 484, 469 P.2d 974, 976
(1970) opined that extraction of ten teeth for denture preparation was elective "in the
sense that no immediate emergency existed, although the teeth were irregular,
discolored and had some decay."; and the court in Rice v. Jaskolski, 412 Mich. 206,
313 N.W.2d 893, 893 (1981), characterized extraction of impacted wisdom teeth as
"preventative.".See also Small v. Gifford Memorial Hosp., 133 Vt. 552, 349 A.2d
703, 704, 705, 706 (1975) (characterizing breast reduction surgery for a women
having pendulous breasts that caused discomfort and affected her posture as elective),
Kinikin, 305 N.W.2d 589 (reduction surgery on women suffering from extensive
fibrocystic disease "prophylactic," Id. at 595, even though "good medical practice
dictated removal of the fibrocystic diseased tissue." Id. at 593); Granado v. Madsen,
729 So.2d 866, 869 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (tonsillectomy); Hunter v. Brown, 81
Wash.2d 465, 502 P.2d 1194, 1196 (1972) (dermabrasion treatment of facial scars
and dark patches (chloasma),elective treatment "for the attempted improvement of
appearance only."); Hitchcbck, 479 F. Supp. at 79 (preexposure rabies
immunization for foreign service assignment); Ellis v. Smith, 528.N.E.2d 826, 828
(Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (foot surgery on muscular dystophy patient). The courts'
characterizations appear broad enough that any procedure not performed in a life-
saving emergency could be elective.
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of alternative courses of treatment open to the patient;56 (5) whether
the court characterized the plaintiff as being specially susceptible to a
particular risk;5 7 and (6) whether the facts of the case were such that
56 Medically recognized "feasible and available" alternative treatments must be
established by expert testimony, Thornton v. Annest, 19 Wash.App. 174, 574 P.2d
1199, 1203 (1978), and the alternatives need not be conservative treatments for
submission of the case to the jury, Marino v. Ballestas, 749 F.2d 162 (M.D. Pa.
1984) (option of closed reduction of broken arm with involvement of radial nerve);
Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Assoc., 191 Conn. 282,465 A.2d 294 (1983) (option of
open renal biopsy under general anesthesia where closed needle biopsy under local
anesthesia resulted in punctured gall bladder, necessitating removal).
57 The frequency of a particular outcome in the patient's position might be higher
than normal. For example, obesity places the patient at elevated risk of post-
operative infection and incisional herniation, Harwell v. Pittman, 428 So.2d 1049
(La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 434 So.2d 1092, reconsideration denied, 436 So.2d 570
(La. 1983), and hemorrhage, Leiva v. Nance, 506 So.2d 131 (La. Ct. App. 1987),
writ denied, 512 So.2d 1176 (La. 1987). Likewise, the chance is elevated for:
hyperpigmentation in orientals from dermabrasion, Hunter, 502 P.2d 1194; keloid
scarring in dark-skinned patients, Mastro v. Brodie, 682 P.2d 1162 (Colo. 1984);
broncospasm from sodium pentothal in asthmatic patients, Siegal v. MtL Sinai
Hosp. of Cleveland, 62 Ohio.App.2d 12, 403 N.E.2d 202 (1978); stroke from
epinepherine contained in xylocaine in artherosclerotic patients, LeBeuf v. Atkins, 28
Wash.App. 50, 621 P.2d 787 (1980); halothane-induced liver failure in patient
presenting possible liver damage before surgery, Cornfeldt, 262 N.W.2d 684;
infection from surgery in patient suffering from Crohn's Disease, Haley v. United
States, 739 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir. 1984); and thrombosis from an arteriogram in a one
year old child, Halley v. Birbiglia, 390 Mass. 540,458 N.E.2d 710 (1983). But see
Haven v. Randolph, 342 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1972), affd, 494 F.2d 1069 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), where paraplegia resulted from transfemoral retrograde arteriogram on a
two year old, the Court opined: "There is some doubt about the magnitude of the risk
since Roy's extreme reaction to the Hypaque injection was apparently the first
recorded instance of such a reaction to aortography in a child under nine years of age."
Id., 494 F.2d at 1071, fn.1. Query how often such procedures are performed on
children and if there is some reason why the frequency of such outcome would be less
in a child under nine.
Conversely, the magnitude of a particular possible consequence might be
overriding to a particular patient for a reason that was known or that should have
been known to the physician. Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983) (laparoscopic tubal ligation failed, pregnancy
presented serious risk to plaintiff although no injuries resulted); Clark v. Miller, 378
N.W.2d 838 (Minn. App. 1986) (plaintiff, a dancer, was primarily concerned with
scarring, which resulted following knee surgery).
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the claim should have sounded in battery, but the case was treated as
one for lack of informed consent.5 8
Preliminary analysis of the reported data set indicates that the
plaintiff has won significantly more appeals in materiality jurisdictions
than in professional jurisdictions. This is not at all indicative of
plaintiff's chances with a jury, however, inasmuch as a high number of
the materiality courts' decisions are not final, the cases being remanded
for trial. Generally, the materiality courts have been more apt to discuss
and adopt an objective causation standard, which reflects the fact that the
professional standard courts often do not reach the causation issue due
to the failure of plaintiff to establish a duty to disclose. The materiality
courts have placed more reliance than professional standard courts on
the elective nature of treatment, the availability of alternative treatments,
and the special susceptibility of the plaintiff to the particular risk which
transpired. This may be the product of the courts' more detailed reviews
in justifying remand for trial and, in some cases, adoption of a new
(i.e., materiality) disclosure standard in that state. Finally, the cases
which might have been categorized as battery are more prevalent in the
materiality courts. This might be the result of the fact that it is easier to
get to the jury in the materiality jurisdiction on the informed consent
claim,59 and because it might be easier to confuse the causes of action
58 In some states, the statute of limitations for intentional torts such as battery is
shorter than for negligence, providing an incentive for a plaintiff to try to characterize
his or her action as one for lack of informed consent.
59 In the materiality jurisdictions, plaintiff may have the case submitted to the jury
for a finding of fact after establishing, by expert testimony, that the risk suffered is a
known risk of treatment. In the professional jurisdictions, expert evidence must also
establish the existence of a duty to disclose. In most of the professional standard
courts, failure to offer such evidence results in a summary judgment for defendant.
The exceptions are Kansas, Natanson, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960),
modified, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1961); and Colorado, Hamilton v. Hardy,
37 Colo.App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976); which, upon plaintiff alleging that no
disclosure took place, shift the burden to the physician to establish that nondisclosure
complies with the practice in the profession.
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where expert testimony on disclosure practices is not offered.60
B. Trial Cases
The data represent cases identified in JVR's data base as lack of
informed consent cases or containing "failure to inform" or "failure to
warn" in the text summary, and which were disposed of in the trial
courts between January 1986 and June 1989, inclusive.6 1 From the
summary provided by JVR, the case name, jurisdiction, and year of
disposition were derived. The data set comprises the following
information: (1) the illness suffered, the treatment, the consequences,
and the amount of the verdict, if any;62 (2) whether the facts presented
60 Cases that appeared to be battery-type actions were largely excluded from this
analysis. Those cases retained had informed consent issues, usually that a collateral
risk arose from a procedure to which, the patient contends, consent was not given.
See infra note 73. These cases should be resolved solely on the battery claim,
inasmuch as there reasonably cannot be a duty imposed to disclose risks of and
alternatives to treatment, where the patient contends that the nature or extent of the
treatment was not even disclosed. See Lipscomb, 733 F.2d 332 (physician
performed a Nissen fundoplication of plaintiff's stomach to treat her hiatal hernia
where consent was given only for gall bladder surgery, defendant liable for failure to
inform of at least a 60% chance of constriction of the esophagus).
61 The data are collected by various court clerks, attorneys, and others, and verified
with the litigating attorneys for accuracy. JVR collects the data for the compilation
of jury verdicts for valuation of personal injuries for litigation purposes. It is not an
'exhaustive collection of all trial court outcomes, but is represented as an unbiased
sample for jury verdict evaluation purposes. The author acknowledges the
contribution of Jury Verdict Research to the present work in subsidizing in part the
trial court data base and in assistance in using the Valuation Handbooks. Subsequent
to the performance of this analysis, counsel for about five percent of the cases were
contacted, and it was found that the characterization of some cases as informed
consent cases was in error. These represent a small fraction of the data set and should
not affect the results.
62 Due to variation in the reporting of summary information, not all of this
information was consistently provided. For example, the indicator variable for
disclosure represents those cases where the summary reports that the physician
contended that disclosure was made or that the patient's consent was informed. Not
every summary reported on this fact, and these cases were coded as no disclosure
being made. Similarly, whether plaintiff's informed consent action was joined with a
malpractice action may have been inconsistently reported. The impact of these
reporting inconsistencies on the results is uncertain.
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a battery-type of action;6 3 (3) whether the informed consent claim was
joined with a negligent treatment claim; and (4) whether the physician
contended that disclosure had been made. The disclosure standard
applicable to the case was assumed to be that-of the state at the time of
disposition of the case.6 4 Settlements before verdict were excluded
from this analysis, as were instances in which insufficient facts were
available for analysis.
Summary analysis of the trial court data indicates that: (1) while
plaintiffs have fared better in professional standard jurisdictions, there is
no significant difference in the likelihood of a plaintiff verdict based on
the law applied, that is, professional or materiality disclosure
standard;65 (2) actions sounding solely in informed consent are more
63 The actions may indeed have sounded in battery but were reported in the data base
as lack of informed consent cases. Lack of consent cases in the data were excluded
from this analysis.
64 There may be some error due to this assignment because the law in Hawaii,
Alaska, and Nebraska is in limbo. See Merz & Fischhoff, supra note 12. Any
impact should be negligible due to the small number (n = 3) of cases from these
courts.
65 P = 0.16 by test of proportions. It was hypothesized that there might be a
possible selection bias toward higher dollar value cases involving more serious
injuries or cases having a higher likelihood of success in the professional
jurisdictions due to possibly higher expenses of litigation (for example, from
increased costs for experts), causing attorneys to be more selective in choosing cases.
However, a Kolmogorov-Smimov two-sample test of the cumulative jury verdict
distributions over the 3-1/2 year period indicates that it cannot be concluded that the
verdicts are drawn from different underlying distributions (Pr < 0.70). Combined
with the nonsignificant difference in the chance of success of plaintiff's claim, the
hypothesis is unsupported. Plaintiff has won about 32% of the cases in the
professional standard jurisdictions and about 26% in the materiality jurisdictions.
Although not a significant difference, the sign is in the right direction, i.e., that
plaintiffs are bringing claims that are more justifiable and are therefore succeeding
more frequently. Nonetheless, one-way analysis of variance of mean verdict valuation
of the claims across the two types of jurisdictions shows a small and
nonsignificantly greater mean value of claim in the materiality jurisdictions, clearly
contrary to the hypothesis. This result is not totally surprising due to the fact that, in
jurisdictions applying either disclosure standard, expert evidence is necessary to
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prevalent in materiality jurisdictions than in professional jurisdictions;
this may be the result of the lower burden required in terms of expert
testimony in the materiality courts; (3) there is a significant association
between a verdict favoring plaintiff and an uncontested nondisclosure,
although this could be explained in part by the inconsistent reporting in
the data set; this is a sensible result inasmuch as, ceteris parabus,
liability is predicated upon the additional issue of physician veracity; and
(4) the battery characterization of the action is significantly associated
with actions brought without concurrent negligence claims, which is
further evidence that the suits involve breakdowns in communication
and lack of consent, and not necessarily risks of treatment (informed
consent) or negligent treatment by the physician.
From the above analysis, several features of the cases have been
identified which yield insight into what is happening in the trial courts
and in appellate court reasoning. A logistic regression model will now
be used to explore whether the disclosure obligation is related to the
magnitude of the risk.
II. Logistic Regression Analysis
The purpose of this analysis is to try to discover whether the
disclosure obligation increases with increasing risk of treatment. Not
only is a positive relationship between these factors of interest, but,
more importantly, a dividing line which separates "material" from
"immaterial" risks, both for physicians in professional standard
jurisdictions and lay jurors in materiality standard jurisdictions. The
methodology is logistic regression analysis, modeling the probability of
a plaintiff's verdict as a function of various predictor variables.
A. Model Development
In addition to the independent predictor variables identified in
establish the risks of treatment, and experts are also necessary (except in rare cases)
for trying the negligent treatment claims which are often joined with the lack of
informed consent claims.
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Section I above, variables addressing the underlying risks and the
choice of treatment have been identified for modeling purposes. First,
four continuous measures of risk were utilized in the present analysis:
(1) the frequency of occurrence of a particular outcome from a given
treatment; 66 (2) mean jury verdicts for personal injuries of the type
suffered by the plaintiff, as summarized in Table 1;67 (3) a quality of
life measure, 6 8 comprised of a subjectively assigned value to the
66 The frequencies have been taken only from the case law; no secondary sources
have been utilized. In some cases, these frequencies have been applied to like cases in
which the frequencies were not reported. With respect to uncertainty, generally a
single figure is quoted in the cases, usually reflecting physician testimony. In the few
instances, ranges have been presented and the midpoint of that range has been used.
When a frequency has been characterized solely as being "less than" some upper
bound, that upper bound has been utilized. Barclay v. Campbell, 683 S.W.2d 498,
501 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), rev'd and rem'd, 704 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. 1986); Ficklin v.
MacFarlane, 550 P.2d 1295, 1296 (Utah 1976). In addition, when erroneous or
ambiguous frequency information was presented to the jury, that value is used. E.g.,
in Gray, 223 A.2d 663, the court recited a 15-20% conditional probability of
worsening plaintiff's condition, given one of several causes of that condition, as the
frequency of paraplegia resulting from a laminectomy. Other cases have recited the
frequency of nerve damage to be about 1%. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 778. See Merz,
The Informed Consent Doctrine in Pennsylvania: Lack of Supreme Court or
Legislative Direction Leaves Law Limping, 137 PITT. LEGAL J. 223 (1989)
(discussing the failure of the Gray court to recognize and properly use conditional
probabilities).
67 The mean values were derived from the Personal Injury Valuation Handbooks
published by Jury Verdict Research, Inc. All values were estimated in 1989 dollars.
Use of median values and/or upper and lower quartiles were considered for this
analysis, but the mean was chosen as most representative of the expected value of a
jury verdict and because the consistent use of mean values provides a relative scale of
consequences. Furthermore, all data was rounded off to one significant figure for
subsequent analyses. Finally, it was felt that the wide distribution of verdicts reflects
too many variables, such as specific extent of injury, type of injury within the data
set, and regional effects on verdicts, so as to render the data of questionable value
beyond the relative scaling used here.
68 There are several different quality of life indices that have been developed in the
last thirty years for the purpose of evaluation of health programs. See generally
QUALrrYOF LIFE ASSESSMRM IN CLINICAL TRALs (B. Spilker ed., 1990). See also,
I-Iiltbrunner and Breitsprecher, Pharmaceutical Risk and the Quality of Life, supra, at
19. These methods are too detailed to work with the summary information provided
in the legal cases. For example, the Sickness Impact Profile (SIP) provides a
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outcome, as summarized in Table 2;69 and (4) the classic measure of
risk, the frequency multiplied by the mean dollar valuation for the
resulting consequences. While risk is technically the chance of an
unfavorable outcome, the frequencies and the outcomes themselves,
independent of each other, provide a measure of risk.70
percentage index based on a series of 136 statements regarding activities, physical
impairment, and psychosocial factors. Bergner, Bobbitt, Carter & Gilson, The
Sickness Impact Profile: Development and Final Revision of a Health Status
Measure, 19 MED. CARE 787 (1981). Therefore, it was necessary to generate a
simple scale based only on physical outcomes. Death as the most severe outcome is
not a fixed feature of these scales, Torrance, Thomas & Sackett, A Utility-
Maximization Model for Evaluation of Health Care Programs, 1972 HLTH SERV.
REs. 118, 119 (describing a von Neuman-Morganstern gamble and time trade-off
elicitation for preferences between health states), but in this case presented an
interesting comparison with the verdict valuation, under which death is far from the
"worst" outcome.
69 This scale was developed based on outcomes presented in the body of case law
analyzed in this study, and its general applicability may therefore be limited. The
scale is highly correlated with the mean verdict values as applied to both the reported
and trial data sets (Spearman Rank Correlations: reported r = 0.746, trial r = 0.435, p
= 0+). The author and an independent rater applied the scale to the consequences in
the two data sets, with inter-rater reliability of 0.85. Inter-rater reliability was
calculated by the number of cases that were rated the same divided by the total
number of cases rated. This somewhat low reliability appears to be impacted by the
lack of knowledge of medical terminology by the second rater, but also reflects the
lack of detail in the reports of injuries suffered. The scale is also extremely similar to
another "Severity Scale" developed in the 1970's for assessment of medical
malpractice issues. See, e.g., Daniels & Andrews, The Shadow of the Law: Jury
Decisions in Obstetrics and Gynecology Cases, in MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL
LIABII IrYAND IE DELIVERY OF OBSTETICAL CARE, VOL. II 177 (V.P. Rostow &
RJ. Bulger, eds. 1989). The two scales applied to the reported data set are highly
correlated (Spearman Rank Correlation r = 0.938, p = 0+).
70 The logarithmic transformations of jury verdicts, the risk, and the frequency were
also explored.
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Table 1
Mean Jury Valuation of Consequences (1989 $ Millions)
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Table 2




3 Scars, tissue damage
4 Damage to bodily part requiring further treatment
5 Partial or temporary paresthesia, loss, or loss of use of bodily
part with no residual impairment
6 Paresthesia, loss, or loss of use of bodily organ with residual
impairment
7 General paresthesia, loss, or loss of function of limb, eye,
ear, minor brain damage
8 Paraplegia, hemiplegia, moderate brain damage, stroke, loss
of two limbs, blindness, deafness, birth defects
9 Quadriplegia, severe brain damage
10 Death
The final aspect of model development was to address the causation
issue, which shields the actual reasoning for a defense verdict. For the
reported data, a description of the complaint or illness suffered by the
patient exists. To model how strongly a medical procedure is indicated
for a patient, a three value scale of the severity of the patient's condition
was developed: [1] represents an elective or optional situation, where
treatment is not medically necessary - where lack of treatment wouldin
no way threaten life or normal (i.e., pre-illness) lifestyle; [2] represents
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non-life threatening situations where treatment is necessary to avoid
impairment of normal lifestyle; and [3] represents severe, disabling, or
life threatening conditions, where diagnosis and treatment are strongly
indicated.7 1 This variable does not reflect the appropriateness of the
actual treatment rendered, nor the availability of alternative courses of
therapy. While the patient's decision necessarily would include
consideration of alternatives, and the risks of alternatives can impact the
"materiality" or significance of risks associated with a given procedure,
insufficient information was provided in the reports to model this
feature. Thus, the present model reflects only the refusal of treatment as
an alternative to the tendered procedure.
B. Regression Results
Each set of data was fitted to a logistic function modeling the
probability of a verdict in plaintifff's favor. The model in general form
is:
[1] Pr(plaintiff wins) = e(b0 + S bi*Xi)/(l+e(bo + S bi*Xi))
where Xi represents each predictor variable. Step-wise logistic
regression was performed with all non-risk measure predictor variables
and one risk measure, and the regression was iterated for each risk
measure. This full model was also estimated with all and with various
subsets of the independent variables, with no difference in result.
71 Coding of the appellate data was performed with this scale by the author and an
independent lay rater, with inter-rater reliability of 0.82 (with omission of the first
30% of cases due to the second rater's initial difficulty in understanding the code).
That this code was applied by lay raters instead of physicians might interject some
error into the analysis. Nonetheless, it is lay jurors who must assess whether the
patient would have accepted treatment, albeit aided by physician testimony and more
detailed information than is available for the present analysis. Application of this
scale showed a significant association with whether the court characterized treatment
as elective (Spearman Rank Correlation r = -0.337, p = 0+). The low reliabilities of
both scales might have been contributed to by the fact that, from having read all of
the cases, the author coded the data with knowledge of more of the facts related to
condition, treatment, and outcome than was presented in the summary table provided
for the independent rater's use.
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1. Reported Cases
For the reported case data set, interaction terms were included to
analyze differences in response to the various risk measures between the
two types of disclosure standards, causation standards, and the index of
severity of the patient's affliction. All interaction terms were not
statistically significant and were dropped from the model. Significant
parameter estimates were found for the final model having the variables
identified in Table 3.
Importantly, a significant relationship appeared with respect to the
log of the mean verdict valuation of the consequences suffered by the
plaintiff. The causation standard and severity index variables were
analyzed with indicator variables, and estimation yielded clearly
nonsignificant parameter estimates for causation standard and a
significant estimate for one of the latter variable indicators. Inasmuch as
the difference between cases where treatment is indicated and those that
are strongly indicated is just significant (p = 0.05), this variable has
been left in the model.
The variables that appear important to decisions favoring plaintiff
from this model yield insight into what is important to appellate courts
reviewing these cases. Most of these important variables may be treated
independently of the risk-based analysis that comprises the purpose of
this study, that is, to determine if a disclosure obligation attaches as a
function of risk.
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Table 3
Final Model Parameters - Appellate Data - All Jurisdictions
Independent 95% Confidence
Variable Coefficient Z-score Interval72
Disclosure Std 1.082 3.31 [ .44; 1.72]
Alternative Treatment 1.134 3.28 [0.46; 1.81]
Battery -2.641 2.34 [0.43; 4.85]
Severity (1) -0.296 -1.10 [-0.82; 0.23]
Severity (2) -0.528 -1.96 [-1.06; 0.00]
Log(mean jury verdict) 0.669 2.03 [0.02; 1.32]
Special Risk 1.792 2.51 [0.39; 3.19]
The courts' discussions of the availability of alternative treatments in
many cases was a critical factor in the decision.73 Further, the handful
72 n = 217.
73 Cases where the court relied particularly on the nondisclosure of alternative
treatments include: Archer v. Galbraith, 18 Wash.App. 369, 567 P.2d 1155 (1977)
(thyroid tumor, hemithyroidectomy performed where observation, drug treatment, and
biopsy were available); Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So.2d 888 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963)
(diagnostic arteriogram given to child for "spells," psychiatric treatment available);
Brown v. Dahl, 41 Wash.App. 565, 705 P.2d 781 (1985) (local or regional
anesthesia alternatives to general); Sauro v. Shea, 257 Pa. Super. 87, 390 A.2d 259
(1978) (same); Cornfeldt, 262 N.W.2d 684 (delay due to test results indicating liver
damage); Creasey, 617 P.2d 1377 (therapeutic treatment instead of surgery); Cress v.
Mayer, 626 S.W.2d 430 (Mo. App. 1981) (exercise and physical therapy instead of
surgical correction of thoracic outlet syndrome); Rook v. Trout, 113 Idaho 652, 747
P.2d 61 (1987) (same); Davis v. Caldwell, 54 N.Y.2d 176, 445 N.Y.S.2d 63, 429
N.E.2d 741 (1981) (availability of biopsy to confirm mammogram results before
mastectomy); Dewes v. Indian Health Service, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 203 (D.S.D. 1980)
(traction of fractured elbow versus open reduction); Doss, 448 So.2d 813 (use of pad
in shoe instead of surgery); Eichelberger v. Barnes Hosp., 655 S.W.2d 699 (Mo.
App. 1983) (venous cutdown versus subclavian stick catheterization); Festa v.
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of cases which appeared to be battery-type actions often involved issues
such as proper communication of the course of treatment in addition to
risk considerations. 74 Lastly, it is clear that the courts consider it very
Greenberg, 354 Pa. Super. 346, 511 A.2d 1371 (1986) (various methods of
sterilization); Hartke, 707 F.2d 1544 (same); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md.
1977) (same); Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash.2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979) (tests available
to diagnose glaucoma); Hales v. Pittman, 118 Ariz. 305, 576 P.2d 493 (1978)
(subtemporal rhizotomy and RF coagulation alternatives to phenol injection
treatment of trigeminal neuralgia); Holland v. Sisters of Saint Joseph of Peace, 270
Or. 129, 522 P.2d 208 (1974) (reduced dose and increased number of treatments of
radiation therapy); ZeBarth v. Swedish Hospital Medical Center, 81 Wash.2d 12,499
P.2d 1 (1972) (same); Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1977) (oxygen or
drugs to help breathing in patient suffering from emphysema versus carotidectomy);
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (abortion availability to pregnant
patient who contracted rubella fever); Jeffries v. McCague, 242 Pa. Super. 76, 363
A.2d 1167 (1976) (superpubic or transurethral versus retropubic prostatectomy);
Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 95 Wash.2d 306, 622 P.2d 1246 (1980) (availability
of tests to diagnose angina); Kissinger, 836 F.2d 678 (intranasal anthostomy instead
of Caldwell-Luc surgical removal of sinus tumor); Lipscomb, 733 F.2d 332
(availability of drug treatment for sliding hiatal hernia where physician performed
Nissen fundoplication procedure for combination paraesphageal and sliding hernia);
Marino, 749 F.2d 162 (broken arm immobilization instead of open reduction);
Poulin, 542 P.2d 251 (two methods of incubator oxygen regulation to premature
baby); Salis v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 989 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (drug regimen not
followed by plaintiff before angiogram); Smith v. Karen S. Reisig, M.D., Inc., 686
P.2d 285 (Okla. 1984) (hormonal therapy instead of hysterectomy); Steele v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 371 So.2d 843 (La. App. 1979) (pap smear monitoring
instead of hysterectomy); Tenney, 624 F. Supp. 305 (delay); Trapp v. Cayson, 471
So.2d 375 (Miss. 1985) (CAT scan or posterior fossa myelogram instead of vertebral
arteriogram); and Wilkinson, 295 A.2d 676 (availability of biopsy to confirm
lymphoma before extensive X-ray treatment).
74 The cases which were categorized as batteries in the first analysis were: Clark,
378 N.W.2d 838 (treatment unauthorized unless arthritis or knee cap malalignment
were found); Cross, 294 S.E.2d 446 (consent to cystoscopy, resection performed);
DeFulvio v. Holst, 272 Pa. Super. 221, 414 A.2d 1087 (1979) (consent to biopsy,
not parotidectomy); Dewes, 504 F. Supp. 203 (incompetence of patient); Gravis v.
Physicians & Surgeons Hosp. of Alice, 427 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1968) (plaintiff's
husband signed consent form, capacity to consent a jury question); Gray, 223 A.2d
663 (consent to exploratory laminectomy, physician cut dentate ligaments to relieve
pressure on spinal cord); Kinikin, 305 N.W.2d 589 (consent to adenomammectomy,
not nonradical mastectomy); and Lipscomb, 733 F.2d 332 (consent to gallbladder
surgery, not hiatal hernia repair).
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important if the patient is in a high-risk group for a particular
outcome. 75 Inasmuch as the presence of these factors in the cases
appears, in many instances, to drive these decisions, all observations
exhibiting these factors were removed and the analysis reperformed.
The result is a more highly significant relationship of the response
variable with the illness severity indicator variable and with the log of
the mean jury verdicts. Again, interaction terms were nonsignificant,
and were omitted from the model. The resulting logistic fit for this
reduced data is presented in Figure 2. The estimate of the parameter for
the elective severity index is not significant, indicating that for model
purposes the estimated response is not different than for the alternative
severity values. This parameter nonetheless has been left in the plotted
model because it shows a large difference in the probability of a plaintiff
judgment in the elective treatment cases, which is something that this
model should reflect, if addressing the causation issue implicit in the
data consistently with the main hypothesis.76
There is thus a definite increase in the probability of a verdict for
plaintiff as the mean jury verdict valuation of the consequences suffered
increases. In addition, the measure of how strongly treatment is
indicated for the patient's condition or ailment appears to be explaining
75 See the cases listed supra at note 57. Importantly, none of these cases
presented a quantitative estimate of the frequency of the risk. Analysis of base rates
and differential risks due to special risk factors would be important in determining
whether the increased risk was important to the decision to accept treatment.
76 Nonsignificance nay be the result of the small number of cases coded as elective
(n = 7). Indicating that there is indeed some difference between these illness severity
groups, analysis of variance of verdict valuations of the claimed injuries within each
causation group shows that injuries sustained vary significantly with the measure of
the severity of the patient's condition (F* = 4.73 with 2,214 df, p = 0.01). This
reflects that the risks of treatment increase with the severity of the illness suffered, in
accord with empirical hospital experience. Larson, Oram & Hedrick, Nosocomial
Infection Rates as an Indicator of Quality, 26 MED. CARE 676 (1988); Britt,
Schleupner & Matsumiya, Severity of Underlying Disease as a Predictor of
Nosocomial Infection, 239 J.A.M.A. 1047 (1978).
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some of the variation in the data, reflecting the causation requirement
and the fact that higher risks of treatment will be accepted by patients
facing more severe consequences of their illness.77
Figure 278
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Despite the nonsignificant interactions found between disclosure
standard and consequence measures above, the data were separated by
professional and materiality disclosure standard, and the logistic
regression model fitted to each data set. The results of the step-wise
regression are presented in Table 4. These results indicate that the
reported case results in the professional standard jurisdictions may be
77 This provides support for the idea that the materiality determination is not
independent of how strongly treatment is indicated for the patient. A de minimis risk
to one suffering a terminal illness might be significant to one facing a choice of
elective treatment. See Merz, supra note 33.
78 Pr = 1/(1+ exp(7.63t + 0..26 x Severityl + 1.39t x Severity2 - 1.28t x
log(consequences))). Lt p < 0.002].
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explained by a significant relationship with mean verdict values of
consequences, and that the parameter estimates for all other risk
measures are nonsignificant. Interestingly, in the materiality courts, no
significant parameter estimates were found for any of the risk measures.
Table 4
Final Reduced Model Parameters - Appellate Data
Materiality versus Professional Jurisdictions
Independent 95% Confidence
Jurisdiction Variable Coefficient Z-score Interval
p79 Alternate treatment 0.645 2.47 [0.13; 1.16]
Severity (1) -0.683 -1.64 [-1.50; 0.13]
(2) -0.581 -1.48 [-1.35; 0.19]
Disclosure made -0.886 -2.15 [-1.69; -0.07]
Special risk 1.109 1.68 [-0.19; 2.40]
Mean jury verdict 0.00024 1.77 [-0.00003; 0.00050]
M80  Alternate treatment 0.556 2.31 [0.08; 1.03]
Battery 1.532 2.00 [0.03; 3.03]
Disclosure made -0.906 -1.54 [-2.06; 0.25]
Special risk 0.718 1.74 [-0.09; 1.53]
Again, parameter estimates for all risk measures had the right signs.
Failure to find a significant relationship appears to be caused by the
nonfinal nature of these decisions, where the courts are not making the
materiality judgment but are remanding the case for trial to allow a jury
to make that factual finding. The feature of the combined data sets that
79 Professional; n = 119.
80 Materiality; n = 98.
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yielded a significant relationship with the log of the verdict measure may
reflect that different approaches to determining physician liability are at
work. No plot of these results is provided.
None of the above models explains a significant amount of the
variation in the data, which is to be expected given the large variation in
fact situations, subjective characteristics of the parties, attorney and
judge competence, and jury composition, all unmeasurable factors
which potentially affect case outcomes. Nonetheless, the significant
estimates of the parameters for the variables give some indication that
the probability of a decision favoring plaintiff, and thus the disclosure
obligation, is related to the verdict valuation measure of consequences.
Importantly, no significant model parameters were found for
frequency of occurrence of the risk, for the product of the frequency and
the monetary valuation of the outcome, or for the alternative quality of
life measure (minimum p > 0.06), although the signs were in the right
direction. This result in the frequency and risk instances might be the
product of limited data availability, where less than 100 cases in the data
set had associated frequencies. With respect to the quality of life
measure, this result may be the product of treating a crude categorical
scale as a quasi-continuous variable. That the signs without exception
are in the right direction nonetheless provides evidence that the mean
verdict valuation of consequences has some correspondence with
personal perceptions of the severity of injuries. Besides the range and
relative differences between categories over which the jury verdict scale
and the quality of life measures vary, the major difference between these
measures is the fact that death is by far not the worst outcome on the
former scale, while it is the ultimate outcome on the latter. While jury
verdicts reflect different types of damages in the calculation of awards,
the values may fortuitously reflect that the subjective disutility of a
debilitating injury is greater than that for death, which position has some
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intuitive appeal.8 1
2. Trial Cases
Of more interest is the trial court data, inasmuch as greater insight
directly into the jury box might be attained from this source. The limited
information available from the data summaries prevented analysis of the
causation issue in these cases. The trial data was fit by step-wise
reduction to a logistic function, with the resulting significant parameters
of the final two reduced models presented in Table 5. The estimates of
parameters for battery and negligence were nonsignificant, and were
dropped from the model. Significant relationships with both
consequence measures were attained for the data from the combined
professional standard and materiality jurisdiction cases. 8 2
Unfortunately, the variables that appeared to be important to the
appellate courts, that is, discussion of available alternative treatment and
special susceptibility of the patient, were not available in the summary
information provided on the trial cases. Further information on
alternative treatments and special risk susceptibilities of the plaintiff as
presented in these trial cases might help explain the jury decisions.
81 The implications of this finding to the development of quality of life measures is
obvious: viewing death as the ultimate state may be improper, depending upon
context. The implications with respect to environmental risk analysis are not as
clear, inasmuch as debilitating but nonfatal outcomes are rarely modeled, nor are
outcomes such as brain or spinal damage (except perhaps for teratogenic effects) or
losses of limbs generally foreseeable consequences of personal exposures to chemical
and radiological environmental insult. Using a categorical scale to approximate a
continuous variable may be inappropriate, inasmuch as the difference between
adjacent categories cannot be represented as constant. The rank order of the scale
appears to be valid, so the error introduced by this approximation should be limited.
82 Only one summary in the trial court data base included the frequency of outcome.
No effort was made at this point to fill in frequencies. This effort is left to a more
detailed analysis of this data.
Merz: Empirical Analysis of Informed Consent 67
Table 5
Model Parameters - Trial Data - All Jurisdictions
Independent 95% Confidence
Model Variable Coefficient Z-score Interval8 3
1 Disclosure standard -0.357 -2.16 [-0.68; -0.03]
Disclosure made -0.876 -2.56 [-1.55; -0.21]
Mean jury verdict 0.00019 1.73 [-0.00002; 0.00041]
2 Disclosure standard -0.707 -2.00 [-1.40; -0.01]
Disclosure made -0.905 -2.40 [-1.64; -0.17]
Quality of life index 0.148 1.76 [-0.02; 0.31]
Again, in the trial courts, whether the physician contends that
disclosure was made is an important factor in determining outcome. The
negative coefficient of the disclosure standard variable indicates that
plaintiffs won more often in the professional standard jurisdictions.
Interaction terms were analyzed and were nonsignificant. Unlike in the
reported data, significant parameter estimates were found here for both
measures of consequences. To learn more about what is driving these
results, the data were separated into professional standard and
materiality court cases, and logistic models fit to these reduced data sets.
The final reduced model variables having significant parameter estimates
for the materiality and professional standard jurisdictions are presented
in Table 6.
'83 n= 186.
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Table 6
Final Reduced Model Parameters -Trial Data
Materiality versus Professional Standard Jurisdictions
Jurisdictional Independent 95% Confidence
Standard Variable Coefficient Z-score Interval
M84  Mean jury verdict 0.000316 2.22 [0.00004; 0.00060]
p85 Disclosure made -0.844 -3.19 [-1.36; -0.331
The dependence of the probability of a plaintiff verdict on physician
disclosure is now seen to be important only in the professional standard
jurisdictions, 8 6 while the parameter estimate for mean verdicts is
negative and nonsignificant, and for the quality of life measure positive
and not significant. Conversely, a significant estimate of the parameter
for mean verdict values is found in the materiality jurisdictions, but,
again, not with the quality of life index.8 7 The fitted model for
84 Materiality; n = 112.
85 Professional; n = 87.
86 P < 0.001. Analysis of the contingency table of plaintiff verdicts in
professional jurisdictions on whether disclosure is asserted by the defendant shows
that plaintiff has a significantly greater chance of winning when defendant does not
contest nondisclosure (c2 = 6.56, ldf, p < 0.02). Due to the uncertainty in data
reporting on this variable, this result, while intuitively satisfying, should be
considered preliminary, pending the availability of more detailed information on the
trial data cases.
87 P > 0.09. Further, one-way analysis of variance of mean verdict valuation of
claims shows a significantly greater mean valuation of injuries in cases won by
plaintiff than cases lost in the materiality courts (F* = 6.70 with 2,112 df, p =
0.011). This outcome reflects the fact that, of eight cases having consequences valued
in excess of $2 million in these jurisdictions, plaintiffs won five of them. This
finding is consistent with the concept developed above that physical disability can be
viewed as a more severe outcome than death, independent.of frequency.
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materiality jurisdictions is graphed in Figure 3.
Figure 3
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These results provide limited evidence that, perhaps, the juries in the
materiality jurisdictions are applying a more consequence-based
standard to the disclosure obligation than are physicians. Without
analysis of frequencies in these cases, this conclusion cannot be drawn
with much certainty. The results found with respect to the quality of life
measure, that is, nonsignificant parameter estimates were found for all
of the models except for the combined jurisdiction trial data analysis, but
in all cases the sign was correct, evince that this index may indeed be a
robust measure. of consequences.
II. Limitations on the Analysis
There are two major limitations on this analysis. First, there is a
possibility of a selection bias in the reported data base toward cases that
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were more easily reduceable by the reviewing court to important issues
such as quantifiable risks or alternative treatments, or those that
presented novel issues of law or difficult fact issues which necessitated
resolution. This highlights the major shortcomings in this type of
analysis of court cases, where potential limitations stem from: (1) court
processes and procedure, where cases are often decided on procedural
grounds or where counsel adopt tactical positions or commit errors
which compromise the case; (2) the nonfinality of cases remanded for
trial, due to the fact that most of these cases are lost to analysis after
remand - they are either settled or subsequent verdicts are not
appealed; 88 the appellate court's decision is thus usually the last
information available regarding the case; (3) a selection bias in the data
towards more serious injuries because of a higher likelihood of suit
being brought against a physician; (4) selective appeals and reporting of
cases; (5) the strong incentives to insurers to settle good claims which
are therefore not litigated; and (6) the significant danger that what
appears in trial transcripts is transformed in the appellate process by the
numerous hands of judges, clerks, and zealous advocates. Nonetheless,
judges make law and adopt policy, as embodied in their common law
decisions, based on precedent and on their perceived notions of fairness
and equity. Precedent is embodied solely in the case reports used as the
foundation of this analysis. Inasmuch as judges draw on this body of
precedent in their decision-making and the medical community must rely
on this information to guide their disclosure practices, a critical review
of the policy may be based properly on the same information available to
the policy-makers.
8 For example, if Largey is not appealed, there will be no public record of the
final result except for this article. Similarly, authorities cite Canterbury for the
proposition that a physician can be held liable for a one in one hundred risk of nerve
injury inherent in a spinal laminectomy, while defendant received a favorable verdict
on remand. Murphy, Canterbury v. Spence - The Case and a Few Comments, 11
FORUM 716 (1976).
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Second, the use of a plaintiff decision as a proxy measure for the
disclosure obligation may be a source of error in the analysis. It is
recognized that there are several reasons why a verdict may be returned
for the defendant, and the lack of special interrogatory use by the courts
and litigants shields this analysis from more detailed insight into jury
rationale. Defendant verdicts may reflect that: (1) disclosure occurred;
(2) there was no duty to disclose the information; (3) the reasonable
patient would have proceeded with treatment even if the information was
disclosed, that is, there is no decisional causal link between the putative
nondisclosure and the outcome; or (4) the tendered medical procedure
did not cause plaintiff's injury. Verdicts for plaintiff also may be
ambiguous, in that a general verdict could be based on success on the
informed consent claim or, if both informed consent and negligent
treatment claims are tried together, success on the latter cause and failure
on the former. Verdicts for plaintiff are nonetheless more diagnostic for
analysis of the risks, because each element of each cause of action must
have been established. It is only the confounding negligence claim that
obscures the data. In this regard, the reported data is more detailed,
giving the appellate court's rationale and decision on the informed
consent claim, although in some cases the appellate court must also
guess at the rationale for the jury's finding. In most reported cases,
however, the informed consent issues were explicitly addressed by the
reviewing court. As precedent on the informed consent law, as argued
above, these decisions are justifiably used in this analysis. The
uncertainty in the basis for the juries' findings is .greater in the trial
cases. Nonetheless, for this analysis, the assumption is made that the
action sounds in informed consent and any confounding negligent
treatment claim is ignored.
IV. Implications of the Results
This analysis provides evidence that the obligation to disclose risk
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information increases with increasing severity of the potential
consequences. Importantly, however, no clear demarcation has been
found separating risks which must be disclosed from those which need
not be disclosed. Physicians may minimize their financial risk arising
from the informed consent laws by disclosing high consequence risks,
and by making more complete disclosures to patients when medical
treatment is not necessary to save the patient's life. How complete a
disclosure should be is still not determinable.
The analysis of trial cases provides evidence that juries might be
applying a "materiality" standard that places emphasis on outcomes.
Combined with the result from the analysis of professional standard trial
cases, which showed no such positive relationship between verdict
valuation of consequences and the probability of a plaintiff verdict, and
the result from analysis of the professional standard reported cases
which showed a marginally significant positive relationship, the
preliminary conclusion might be drawn, by discounting the appellate
results for being one step removed from the jury, that the disclosure
practices of the medical profession are based on criteria different than
relied upon by materiality court juries. 89 Juries in the materiality courts
appear to be applying a consequence-based decision rule, but, again,
more information on these cases must be collected and analyzed to
89 For example, the nondisclosure of risks occurring less than one percent of the
time, Granado, 729 So.2d at 874 (Halothane anesthesia resulted in liver failure and
death); or risks deemed to be too remote to mention, Sagala, 533 A.2d 165
(pulmonary embolism, death following foot surgery); Largey, 540 A.2d at 505
(1988); or risks which could be self-inducing, Pardy, 783 F.2d 710 (anaphylactic
shock reaction to IVP agent Conray 60). Some judges have suggested ruling as a
matter of law that there is no obligation to disclose "minimal" risks, such as those
having a frequency of less than one in one hundred. Ficklin, 550 P.2d at 1298
(Crockett, J., concurring specially) (where hemiparesis resulted from bypass surgery).
Several researchers have indeed found that physicians tend to disclose high frequency
risks and not low probability events, even if the potential consequences of those low
frequency risks are severe. Faden, Lewis, Becker, Faden & Freeman, Disclosure
Standards and Informed Consent, 6 J. HLTH. POL. POL'Y. & L. 255, 277 (1981).
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confirm this observation. 90
The reported case analysis failed to show a significant relationship
between the probability of a decision favoring plaintiff and the
frequency of occurrence of the risk (p > 0.06). To explore this further,
Figure 4 presents a plot of plaintiff and defendant decisions on a log
frequency - log verdict valuation risk-space.9 1.No pattern of decisions
favoring plaintiff is evident, providing additional evidence that
frequency may not be an important variable in assessment of risks.
Nonetheless, an approach to defining a standard for disclosure could be
adopted with this type of playing-off consequences against frequencies
of occurrence.
For example, a standard might be expressed as the line D - D in
Figure 4, where disclosure would be required for risks lying above and
to the right of the line. Due to the subjectivity in assessing values for
consequences and difficulty in determining frequencies for low
probability risks, this approach may have limited usefulness.9 2 It is
nonetheless valuable for understanding and framing the disclosure
problem.
90 What has been coined the availability heuristic may help explain this result,
inasmuch as the subjective assessment of the frequency of occurrence might be
swayed by the severity of the injury sustained by the plaintiff. See Merz &
Fischhoff, supra note 12, for a discussion of this and other cognitive biases which
may affect patient and jury decision-making. Issues of communications of risks may
have applicability in the courtroom, inasmuch as measures taken by counsel to help
the jury understand the risks can help them make their decision. At least one court
has mentioned that testimony may be received from "any witness with knowledge of
the particular inquiry, such as... whether the average patient would consider the
risk in making a decision." Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash.App. 272, 522 P.2d 852,
861 (1974), affd per curiam, 85 Wash.2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975), thus arguably
opening the witness stand to expert decision analysts.
91 Defendant's and plaintiff's decisions at the same location are shown, but the plot
does not indicate multiple decisions for either.
92 Further development of this approach is beyond the scope of the present article,
but could be a fruitful area for further research.
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Apart from risks, the appellate courts have focused on various
issues embedded in the informed consent claims such as the availability
of alternative treatments and whether the patient was especially
susceptible to a particular risk or outcome. Physicians should thus
disclose the medically recognized alternative courses of treatment for a
patient's condition, and special physiological risk factors that could
impact outcomes.
In the trial courts in professional standard jurisdictions, the single
most important predictor appears to be whether the physician contends
that disclosure was made. If the defendant contends that disclosure
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that the physician is being untruthful. If disclosure did not occur, the
jury may be free to simply choose between the viewpoints of opposing
experts. The defendant and his or her expert witnesses will assert that
there was no obligation to disclose, while plaintiff must produce
physicians who testify that it is the practice of like practitioners to
disclose.
Conclusions
The informed consent law is still in a development stage, and despite
an extensive literature on the subject, many questions remain
unanswered, providing a fruitful area for research that can contribute to
the policy of the law and its implementation in the courts, and to
physician-patient communications and decision-making. This analysis
presents a regression model which helps explain outcomes of medical
informed consent cases. This is an important factor in implementation of
the informed consent laws, which developed in recognition of patient
autonomy, but which impose unclearly defined obligations on the
medical profession. Indeed, this study provides firm evidence that there
is no fine line separating risks which must be disclosed from those
which need not be disclosed.
As the limited availability of useful information for this study
shows, a more efficient feedback mechanism to physicians regarding the
limits of their obligation is required. Further research involving the
identification of trial court cases, contacting the attorneys involved, and
the collection of more specific information regarding jury findings could
help refine the analysis performed herein. However, the most direct and
equitable resolution of this issue may be the adoption by state
legislatures of laws requiring the use of special interrogatories in every
informed consent case.9 3 Such an act could require that copies of trial
93 This requirement might further lead to less informed consent claims -being
gratuitously added to malpractice suits, to avoid the use of special verdict forms.
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transcripts or a summary thereof be provided to a clearing house.94
Undoubtedly, enabling greater information flows will facilitate
physician awareness of their disclosure obligations, and will promote a
more "informed discussion of informed consent. ' 95
More generally, this study presents an example of using somewhat
objective quantitative measures of risk to explain court outcomes. Such
quantitative measures have not found their ways into the courtroom, but
they could be used to help the fact finder address risk issues. Further,
risks find their way into court in failure to warn and right-to-know
contexts. While this study provides limited evidence that juries are
somewhat capable of handling the risk issues inherent in the decision
regarding medical treatment, how well juries and others do this in failure
to warn and right-to-know contexts is a question worthy of future
research. Issues of risk perception and decision-making in the jury box
may become even more important in the coming years in toxic tort and
community right-to-know contexts, and the legal community should
aggressively undertake to understand how these issues may affect court
outcomes.
Special verdict forms also can help clarify the issues for the fact finder, especially
since the jury is in essence asked to carry out a risk analysis and make a decision.
These forms can hypothetically be formulated to lead the jury through the problem.
Further work on this is left to. the future.
94 The American Medical Association, American Dental Association, medical
insurers, or other organizations could provide the resources for data collection,
analysis, and dissemination.
95 Meisel & Roth, Toward an Informed Discussion of Informed Consent: A
Review and Critique of the Empirical Studies, 25 AiZ. L. REV. 263 (1983).
